
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Teresa Ulrich, Melissa Ulrich,
John Ulrich, Mark Mazza and
Patricia Wtulich



SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY CHANCERY DIVISION: MORRIS COUNTY DOCKET NO.: C-121-13

KING TRANSCRIPTION SERVICES, LLC,

Plaintiff,

VS.

PHOENIX TRANSCRIPTION, LLC, FRANK ULRICH, TERESA ULRICH, MELISSA ULRICH, JOHN ULRICH, MARK MAZZA and PAT WTULICH,

Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

THIS MATTER, having been opened to the Court upon the motion of John Fialcowitz, Esq., counsel for Defendants Phoenix Transcription, LLC ("Phoenix"), Teresa Ulrich ("Teresa"), Melissa Ulrich ("Melissa"), John Ulrich ("John") (collectively, the "Phoenix Defendants") and Patricia Wtulich ("Patricia") for an Order, pursuant to *Rule* 4:46-2, granting the Phoenix Defendants and Patricia summary judgment and dismissing the Amended Verified Complaint with prejudice; and the Court having considered the parties' submissions and for good cause shown,

IT IS on this the day of January, 2015,

ORDERED as follows:

 The motion of the Phoenix Defendants and Patricia is (GRANTED.
--	----------

2. The Amended Verified Complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice. Qo

3. Mr. Fialcowitz shall serve a copy of this Order on all parties within __days. The Caural

Cross states on

Hon. Stephan Hansbury, P.J. Ch.

This motion was:

opposed.
unopposed.

Deboling Transcriptor, Teresa Whil, Milissa Which, John, Which, main Marga and Pat Whalich SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY CHANCERY DIVISION: GEN. EQUITY MORRIS COUNTY DOCKET NO.: C-234-13

KING TRANSCRIPTION SERVICES, LLC

Plaintiff,

vs.) TRANSCRIPT OF) MOTION

PHOENIX TRANSCRIPTION, LLC, et al.

Defendants.

Place: Morris County Courthouse

Washington and Court Streets Morristown, NJ 07963-0910

Date: January 23, 2015

A.D. #

BEFORE:

HONORABLE STEPHAN C. HANSBURY, P.J.Ch.

TRANSCRIPT ORDERED BY:

JOHN FIALCOWITZ, ESQ., (Law Offices of John Fialcowitz, LLC)

APPEARANCES:

RONALD T. NAGLE, ESQ., (Ronald T. Nagle, Esq., PC) Attorney for the Plaintiff

FRANK ULRICH, Pro Se Defendant

JOHN FIALCOWITZ, ESQ., (Law Offices of John Fialcowitz, LLC) $\,$

Attorney for Defendants Phoenix Transcription, et al.

Transcriber: Jennifer Wtulich PHOENIX TRANSCRIPTION 796 Macopin Road West Milford, NJ 07480

Audio Recorded
Recording Opr: Not Indicated

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1 (Proceeding commenced at 1:28 p.m.) 2 THE COURT: Please have a seat. Excuse me, 3 all right this is the matter of King Transcription Services versus Phoenix. Docket Number C-121-13, and 5 may we have appearances, please? 6 MR. NAGLE: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 7 Ronald Nagel, on behalf of the plaintiff. THE COURT: Sir. 8 9 MR. ULRICH: Frank Ulrich, representing 10 myself as Pro se. 11 THE COURT: Sir, how are you? 12 MR. ULRICH: Very good, thank you. 13 MR. FIALCOWITZ: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 14 John Fialcowitz, representing the rest of the caption. 15 THE COURT: Good afternoon. Who would like 16 to go first? 17 MR. FIALCOWITZ: I'd be happy to go first, 18 Your Honor. I moved for Summary Judgment on behalf of 19 the Phoenix defendants, Teresa Ulrich, John Ulrich, Melissa Ulrich and Pat Wtulich. 20 21 This is a case about courthouse and 22 transcriber contact information. This case has been 23 pending since September 13th, 2013. The parties had 24 approximately 15 months to engage in discovery and 25 develop the record.

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Material Facts and King's response, it struck me that there really isn't any uncontest -- you know, any contested material facts relating to this information and the basic circumstances around this industry. And we feel that this matter is right for Summary Judgment before the Court now. We have a trial date on March 2nd. It's a trial date that's been put off twice before.

As I reviewed the Statement of Uncontested

There's basically six claims that King is asserting against my clients and I'll group Phoenix, Teresa, John, Melissa and I'll call them the Phoenix defendants today if that's all right with Your Honor, just to abbreviate -- and Patricia.

First, they're claiming that my clients misappropriated their trade secrets. That's in count five of the Amended Verified Complaint.

The second claim they're asserting against my clients is that they breached fiduciary duties. That's in count three of the Amended Verified Complaint.

Tucked into count three is also a claim for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty on the part of Mr. Frank Ulrich, co-defendant.

The fourth set of claims arise out of an alleged aiding and abetting, tortious interference --

excuse me, aiding and abetting a breach of restrictive covenant and tortious interference.

Fifth set of claims are these conversion, unfair competition claims; which are count seven and eight of the Amended Verified Complaint.

And the last group of claims, if you will, is a tortious -- what I call the un-pled tortious interference claim arising out of alleged piracy of transcribers.

It's important, even before I go into my presentation to point out to the Court that it's undisputed that none of my clients had any kind of non-compete or non-disclosure, non-solicitation agreement with the plaintiff, King Transcription. All the claims are basically Tort based claims.

And before I proceed, Your Honor, I want to do this in the way that is most useful for you. If it would be most useful I could do one claim at a time and allow Mr. Nagle and Mr. Ulrich -- would that be easiest for you?

THE COURT: It doesn't matter to me, whatever you find easiest.

MR. FIALCOWITZ: Okay.

THE COURT: I'll adjust, I promise.

MR. FIALCOWITZ: I'm sure you will.

I'll start with the mis-appropriation of trade secret claim, which again is found in count five of the Amended Verified Complaint. Our Motion for Summary Judgment on that claim is based simply on the fact that King cannot prove either a trade secret or the necessary employment relationship. As we set forth in the papers, the issue — the information at issue here is this — the courthouse contacts within the transcriber units in the Superior Court and these transcriber names.

We put in evidence on -- Exhibit 7 of my certification is the AOC list of transcriber units and contact personnel and their telephone numbers. We've put in the vicinage web pages which show this information. There is nothing secret about this information.

Transcriber names; the transcribers know each other through family relationships. King itself had basically sent emails out to the other transcribers that disclosed the names of these transcribers. Again nothing is secret about this information.

And on top of it all, as I attached in

Exhibit 2 to my certification, King itself broadcasts

that fact that it does business with the Bergen

Transcript Unit, the Essex Transcript Unit, the Hudson

-- and it was purposeful. And the stuff was out there for well over a year that they did business -- and I'll talk about the additional significance of that when we get to the restrictive covenant section.

So for those reasons, Your Honor, we contend that Summary Judgment is appropriate with the misappropriation of trade secret claim.

Second, with regard to the breach of fiduciary duty claim. We have put in not only the testimony of Mr. Froonjian, King's Mr. Froonjian, basically saying none of our people had fiduciary duties, but the whole concept of fiduciary duty from the <u>FG</u> Supreme Court case is that there is a relationship of trust and confidence built on sort of one party having a superior or dominant position in the relationship.

My clients, to the extent they had -- John had no relationship with King at all. But, Teresa and Melissa and Patricia were low-paid independent contractors. Again, not the relationship that gives rise to a fiduciary duty. And I note in the opposition, King didn't address our arguments. So for that reason alone, we would ask that the breach of fiduciary duty claim in count three of the complaint be dismissed.

Turning to the aiding and abetting on Mr.

Ulrich's alleged breach of fiduciary duty. There's several grounds to have this claim dismissed. The first one, and it relates to both aiding and abetting counts is, there's a knowledge requirement that is imposed. Like our clients, Phoenix defendants,

Patricia, they have to show that our clients knew about this restrictive covenant in the King Operating Agreement.

And I went through the record on this case, I can't find anything in terms of admissible evidence that King submitted to show that my clients knew about this restrictive covenant. In fact, they've certified, and I also in my reply quoted from Teresa's deposition where she again said, "I had no knowledge of this restrictive covenant".

And then just turning to the basic fiduciary duty. The point I would also emphasize with the Court there is that the Court really has to look at the substance of what's going on here.

Mr. Ulrich, at best is a member, after

November 2012, when all the events that are alleged

took place. All he is, is a 33 and a third percent

owner in King; doesn't have a controlling interest; no

role in the operations of the company. And based on --

looking at the act, I don't see how you can imply a fiduciary duty there.

1.5

Again, looking back at <u>FG</u> and the basic definition of what is a fiduciary. Someone who's in a dominant or superior position. That's not Mr. Ulrich after November of 2012.

Turning to the fourth set of claims; the aiding and abetting, the breach of restrictive covenant. The additional point -- I didn't do a good job in my papers and I really want to emphasize with the Court as I went back through things, is looking at this restrictive covenant, I think it's critical that the Court look at the industry we're talking about. It's hard to imagine a more regulated industry than the transcription industry.

Contrasting it with the <u>Platinum Management</u>

<u>versus DAHMS</u> case where it's private buyers who have

price preferences, toy preferences. In the

transcription industry, there's no product

differentiation. If you look at Exhibit 3 to Teresa's

certification, the Standards Booklet, the Standards

booklet says exactly how everybody has to prepare a

transcript. You have to conform to those guidelines.

It's not a situation where a transcript from KLJ

Transcripts is going to differ from a transcript from

Phoenix. It's going to -- they all have to do it the exact same way so we don't have an industry with product differentiation.

Nor do we have an industry that has price differentiation because the price of transcripts are set by statute. That's N.J.S.A. 2B:, I think it's 7-4, it sets the price of the transcripts. So we have a very unique animal in terms of the industry that we're talking about here which I think sets us apart from cases like Platinum Management, LaMorte Burns where those cases involve private buyers with a whole range of preferences where a sales agent might provide a competitor with a competitive advantage. Our case is completely different.

Turning to the conversion and unfair competition claims. Again, there is nothing proprietary or -- that gives King an exclusive right to possess the names and contact information for transcript unit personnel and these transcribers. And for that reason alone, both of those claims fault.

And finally, the last set of claims with regard to the piracy of -- of these transcribers. Not only was it not pled in the Amended Verified Complaint, but just looking at the substance of it. They put in, the same certifications we all looked at back in

October of 2013 on the Order to Show Cause; the Hicks's certification and the Powers's certification. In both those certifications, Ms. Hicks and Ms. Powers say that they allegedly were approached by Mr. Ulrich but they remained with King.

So how can you say there's piracy? The only proof they have are these two certifications and the transcribers didn't jump ship. So there's a fatal lack of causation to this claim.

Your Honor, again this case is really, in my mind, the same as it was when we appeared before Your Honor back on October 2013. We've given King the opportunity to develop its claims exhaustively. My clients were deposed for three days. But at this point, Your Honor, I believe it's appropriate to grant my clients Summary Judgment.

THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

MR. FIALCOWITZ: Thank you.

THE COURT: Yes, sir?

MR. NAGLE: Thank you, Your Honor.

Yes, with regard to the issue of the trade secrets. Our position is we paid Mr. Ulrich, Frank Ulrich, very well to work with us. We gave him the opportunity to take clients and family members and friends to Devils games and dinners and meals. And the

purpose of that was to establish relationships. 1 that's what we contend our -- our confidential and 2 proprietary information is. It's the relationships 3 that Mr. Ulrich established with these individuals. 4 5 Their names may be known but the relation --THE COURT: And that has what to do with the 6 7 defendant that's made that motion? MR. NAGLE: Well, the first thing that Mr. 8 9 John Ulrich did was go out and contact these very 10 individuals who Frank Ulrich had the relationships with. So it's pretty -- I think pretty obvious that 11 12 his brother gave him these names. 13 THE COURT: Ah, it is, and what proof do you 14 have of that? MR. NAGLE: Out of all the court --15 16 THE COURT: And the names that he gave, 17 aren't they the same ones that are on the AOC list and the Lawyers Diary and everything else? 18 19 MR. NAGLE: The names are known, Your Honor 20 21 THE COURT: Okay, there you go --THE COURT: -- but out of -- out of all of 22 23 the courthouses that you could go to in the State and 24 all of the people that you could contact in the various

courthouses, the first thing that they do is go to

1 these very two individuals in Bergen County who Frank 2 Ulrich has advised during his depositions, he had over 3 for barbeques. THE COURT: But how does it get to be a trade 4 5 secret? How does it get to be privileged -confidential information? 6 7 MR. NAGLE: It's the relationship. It's the relationship that they're -- they're trading off of 8 9 between our client, Mr. Ulrich, the names are similar. They're brothers. That's -- that's what's 10 11 confidential. That's what's proprietary --THE COURT: What's confidential? There's 12 nothing confidential. 13 14 MR. NAGLE: The relationships that we've established with these individuals to know that if you 15 1.6 use us, you --THE COURT: So -- that's not confidential. 17 18 There's a relationship there. That's all, I get it. 19 MR. NAGLE: Right. 20 THE COURT: That's not protected. It's not a 21 confidential trademark secret, et cetera. 22 MR. NAGLE: Under the case law, Your Honor, 23 and we cited the Ingersoll-Rand case where it says if 24 you put an individual in a position where they're able

25

to create something --

THE COURT: We're not talking about him, we're talking about the -- the group -- Phoenix group.

MR. NAGLE: Right. Well what -- what happened was the Phoenix group ended up taking that information --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. NAGLE: -- and going off to these very courthouses and establishing a competing business --

THE COURT: And you have -- you have evidence to prove that those names were given -- well, you know I don't know that you need evidence because the names aren't privileged. The bottom line, they aren't privileged. Their relationship is nice, that's cool. I get that --

MR. NAGLE: And -- and there's a lot of case law that we've cited in our brief that says, you know, an employer has an expectation of protecting relationships with their clients. And that's what we were trying to do here, is protect our relationship with our clients and not allow this kind of trade-off of one Ulrich versus the other Ulrich, to come in and say, "Well you knew my brother, now you know me," and I know exactly who to go to.

You know it -- it just -- didn't fall into his lap, he knew exactly where to go when he went to

1	these courthouses. And within two months they're
2	making \$40,000 in a start-up business
3	THE COURT: Let's assume for a minute and
4	I'm just for the sake of argument that this
5	Ulrich passed that information onto the defendants; so
6	what. Why can't they use it?
7	MR. NAGLE: Well then, it's in a breach of
8	his fiduciary obligation.
9	THE COURT: We're not talking about him yet,
10	we're talking about them.
11	MR. NAGLE: Right.
12	THE COURT: How did they violate anything by
13	assuming you're right, by taking the names okay,
14	I'll go contact that person.
15	MR. NAGLE: They knew that that
16	THE COURT: What did they do wrong?
17	MR. NAGLE: they knew that Frank was a
18	former employee
19	THE COURT: Okay, big deal. They knew he was
20	an employee.
21	MR. NAGLE: As an employee, Frank had certain
22	fiduciary obligations and obligations to maintain
23	THE COURT: Why can that shift the burden to
24	these people? How does it get to them?
25	MR. NAGLE: Your Honor, why would they

1	I'll ask I guess a rhetorical question. Why would
2	they not use an Ulrich to create the company? Why
3	would they start paying Frank in cash? Why would they
4	start paying his cable bill?
5	When you look at the telephone calls that
6	Frank made he's in this period of three days in
7	April
8	THE COURT: Yeah, but what did assuming he
9	did all those things
10	MR. NAGLE: Right.
11	THE COURT: how does that affect a claim
12	against the defendants?
13	MR. NAGLE: Because they knew it was wrong.
14	THE COURT: Why? What did they didn't
15	know about the restrictive covenant agreement.
16	MR. NAGLE: They didn't know about the
17	restrictive covenant but they knew he was an employee
18	of the company
19	THE COURT: So what
20	MR. NAGLE: and they they knew it was
21	wrong. Everything
22	THE COURT: Why, where where is where
23	is there one scrap of evidence that shows they knew it
24	was wrong?
25	MR. NAGLE: If they didn't know it was wrong,

why wouldn't they just pay Frank with a check, not made out to cash? Why would they -- use an Ulrich to create the company --

THE COURT: You know, you can't throw speculation out there and hope it flies and wins. What's your hard evidence today? What are the material facts which prove -- that permits you to make the allegation you've made against these defendants?

MR. NAGLE: When you add them all together,
Your Honor --

THE COURT: Ah, circumstantial evidence, credibility, right. Okay, all right; I'll tell you what, I'll let you finish.

MR. NAGLE: Okay. I think that takes us through the trade secret and aiding and abetting.

As far as the restrictive covenant; you know -- it's a -- it's something as a partner in the business Mr. Ulrich agreed to. He's a one-third owner of the business. And whether or not -- again, as a former employee he has a fiduciary obligation to the company. And he can't go out and he can't just say, "All right, now I'm going to give you all the secrets that I used --

THE COURT: But you're talking about him, we're not up to him, we're talking about Phoenix.

MR. NAGLE: Right. 1 2 THE COURT: So tell me what you're telling me about Phoenix. 3 MR. NAGLE: Well, Phoenix is arguing the 4 5 restrictive covenant isn't enforceable as to Mr. Ulrich, so --6 THE COURT: No they're not. 7 MR. NAGLE: Yeah, that was part of their 8 9 argument. 10 THE COURT: Well, they can't make it because 11 they're not his client. MR. NAGLE: Well, that's kind of what I 12 13 understood but anyway I'm addressing it because --14 THE COURT: Well, except that I suppose to 15 the extent that it rubs off on them, I guess they can 16 make that argument. 17 MR. NAGLE: Right. But that's the argument 18 -- they did argue that the restrictive covenant wasn't 19 enforceable, so -- I'm addressing that because they 20 addressed it. And -- and -- there is, Your Honor, 21 under that Wear-ever case, a situation where, you know, 22 two maybe didn't go with them, transcribers but eight 23 did. Eight of our best left us and haven't come back. 24 THE COURT: What's wrong with that? 25 MR. NAGLE: It -- it -- it was specific

1	targeting of these eight individuals.
2	THE COURT: So what.
3	MR. NAGLE: The only reason they knew the
4	names of the individuals was because Mr. Ulrich gave
5	them that direction.
6	THE COURT: Well maybe the other two gave
7	them the names.
8	MR. NAGLE: Mr. Ulrich testified at his
9	deposition that he steered them to Phoenix.
10	THE COURT: Yeah, okay. But what does that
11	have to do with Phoenix?
12	MR. NAGLE: And then Phoenix focuses on those
13	individuals
14	THE COURT: So what did they do wrong?
15	MR. NAGLE: and comes it's the same
16	thing as <u>Wear-ever</u> .
17	THE COURT: What did they do wrong?
18	MR. NAGLE: Taking our best transcribers away
19	from us as an effort to hurt the business.
20	THE COURT: Ah I'd imagine it was an
21	effort to benefit their business, not necessarily hurt
22	yours, but
23	MR. NAGLE: It did both, and that was what
24	happened in the <u>Wear-ever</u> case
25	THE COURT: What did they do wrong?

1	MR. NAGLE: Pirating our transcribers.
2	THE COURT: That's a nice word, pirating, but
3	what what did they do wrong?
4	MR. NAGLE: Focusing on the specific best
5	eight transcribers that we had is wrong, and they
6	THE COURT: You don't think a lawyer who's
7	who goes to another firm and identifies the best
8	lawyers in the firm and tries to induce them to come to
9	that firm, that that's wrong too?
10	MR. NAGLE: I I with with no other
11	facts, maybe not but given the facts of this case
12	THE COURT: Which are what? That's what I'm
13	trying to get to.
14	MR. NAGLE: Again, you have cash payments
15	being made to Mr. Ulrich. You have phone calls Mr.
16	Ulrich is making on behalf of, presumably, Phoenix.
17	He's wrapped up in the business
18	THE COURT: Presumably. Here we are at a
19	Motion for Summary Judgment and you're saying
20	presumably.
21	MR. NAGLE: I think when you add all the
22	facts together though, Your Honor
23	THE COURT: Right. Well, I know that's your
24	hope.
25	MR. NAGLE: Well I and I I think

1	that's the view that that I have. When we add them
2	all together, it creates a situation where clearly
3	Phoenix knew what they were doing was wrong.
4	If they didn't think they were doing wrong,
5	they would have been above board and they would have
6	done things clearly out in the open. Instead they hid
7	under the radar and tried to make it look like their
8	brother wasn't involved.
9	THE COURT: And when you asked them why they
10	paid him in cash, what did they say?
11	MR. NAGLE: It was a loan.
12	THE COURT: Okay.
13	MR. NAGLE: It's not treated as a loan on the
14	tax return. There's no documents to substantiate it as
15	a loan.
16	THE COURT: So, what else?
17	MR. NAGLE: That's it, Your Honor.
18	Everything else we've addressed in our papers.
19	THE COURT: Okay. All right, well in spite
20	of your enthusiasm, I will grant the application to
21	dismiss. It comes down to really two things. One is
22	are there trade secrets; no there's no trade secrets.
23	All the information that is out there is out there,
24	period; end of story.

You can look on the internet and see here's

all the people. You can go to the courthouse and say, "Who's the person I should contact?" and they'll tell you. There's no trade secret involved. And the evidence is clear that these defendants did not know of any restrictive covenant.

So in terms of aiding and abetting, conversion, unfair competition, tort claims; they all go out the window because you don't have those two specific issues.

Now there's other subtleties like fiduciary duty. Well they're low-paid, independent contractors so there's no fiduciary duty there. There's no product differentiation or price, we know that. There's nothing proprietary. There's nothing secret and there's nothing -- no agreement.

This world has a -- this world fosters competition. It recognizes that restrictive covenants, at least in New Jersey, have merit; not all states do. But there's simply nothing to suggest that there's a claim against these defendants. There are no material facts in dispute. If I look through the Statement of Facts submitted, I can't even get a claim -- a cause of action out of them; by that I mean the plaintiff.

So there's simply no legal or factual basis to sustain the possibility that the judgment could be

entered against Phoenix and the individuals. So I will grant the application; they're out of the case.

Okay, who wants to go next?

MR. NAGLE: Your Honor, I had filed a motion,
I guess earlier -- with regard -- I guess a partial
Summary Judgment Motion as to Mr. Ulrich. I submitted
a reply -- Your Honor's familiar with -- and there's a
lot of paperwork and I know you're familiar with it
all.

The only thing I would emphasize is that Mr. Ulrich did give a deposition and he should be limited to his testimony at his deposition. We tried to find out through his deposition what his causes of action were and what his claims were. And in his opposition to the motion, he seems to have — to try and broaden that and we believe that he should be stuck to his deposition testimony.

THE COURT: Okay. I don't know what that means, but.

MR. NAGLE: In terms of claims. He made a claim for oppression --

THE COURT: He stuck to the -- to the counter-claim he filed, yes.

MR. NAGLE: Right. But when we took his deposition, we asked him what provision of the

1	Operating Agreement do you claim is violated. He said
2	specifically section 6.01. In his opposition, he's now
3	broadening that. Again we took his deposition, we
4	asked him about
5	THE COURT: I'm sorry, you're confusing me
6	completely. Are you asking that I dismiss part
7	certain parts of his counter-claim?
8	MR. NAGLE: Correct.
9	THE COURT: Which ones?
10	MR. NAGLE: The entire counter-claim.
11	THE COURT: Wait whoa wait a minute.
12	He's he's a direct he's a member of your company
13	and he's not been treated as a member since this matter
14	came up. Why does that give it alone, give him
15	claims against your client?
16	MR. NAGLE: Well, he made a decision to walk
17	away from the company after he was terminated.
18	THE COURT: Can you show me that he's been
19	invited to all the meetings? That's he's been paid?
20	That he has all the benefits of a full partner?
21	MR. NAGLE: In in his deposition
22	transcript he admitted that the first time that he had
23	any contact
24	THE COURT: That's not what I'm asking you.
25	MR. NAGLE: or tried right

1	THE COURT: How are you going to prove that
2	he's been treated as a full member?
3	MR. NAGLE: We there was no historical
4	meetings, Your Honor. There was no historical I
5	mean it's a small company
6	THE COURT: He's one of three people that
7	owns your company.
8	MR. NAGLE: Right.
9	THE COURT: And he's been shut out, that's
10	pretty clear.
11	MR. NAGLE: Your Honor, he made that decision
12	to be shut out. He walked away. We asked him to come
13	back and help out with the company as a co-owner and he
14	said no. He left the company and walked.
15	THE COURT: So, he has no claim against the
16	company for for example, he's asking that I dissolve
17	the company I guess and appoint a referee in order to
18	divide up the proceeds. He has no legitimate claims of
19	that nature?
20	MR. NAGLE: Not in under case law, Your
21	Honor.
22	THE COURT: Of course he does.
23	MR. NAGLE: I view it differently,
24	respectfully.
25	THE COURT: Well, how can you say that? He

1	owns one-third of this company. What does he do, just
2	walk away and say good-bye? No money, no transaction,
3	no resignation, no dissolution, no nothing?
4	MR. NAGLE: I'm talking specifically with
5	regard to the oppression claim.
6	THE COURT: Yeah, I am too.
7	MR. NAGLE: Right. And and the only
8	incidences of oppressions he claims is not being paid
9	dividends or distributions.
10	THE COURT: That's not what he says at all.
11	But really how can you take the position? He owns one-
12	third of your company. He's not been participated and
13	he has not been permitted to participate in the
14	company as an owner.
15	MR. NAGLE: Based on his own decision to do
16	that. We asked him, after he was terminated to come
17	back
18	THE COURT: Please don't
19	MR. NAGLE: and help out.
20	THE COURT: And have you been paying him?
21	Have you been telling him of
22	MR. NAGLE: No.
23	THE COURT: board meetings.
24	MR. NAGLE: No, we haven't been paying him
25	because we've had this motion before Your Honor in July

or June. We haven't been paying him because of the offsets that we have against him for breaching the covenant and doing what he's done.

THE COURT: Well, good luck with that.

Of course, counts one and two remain in the counter-claim, there is no question about it. He's an owner of the company, he has a right to pursue those claims. I don't know that he'll win, but of course he does. I really don't understand your argument. Some of the other counts I can understand. He didn't breach the -- you didn't breach the contract; I think that's one of them under the Operating Agreement.

MR. NAGLE: Correct.

THE COURT: I get that. The only claim is that he was fired. He says the Operating Agreement doesn't permit it; well it does. I get that. But his — their first — I think it's counts one and two; of course they remain; really. They're legitimate judicial claims against your client. I don't know how I could say it otherwise.

I'm not saying he's going to win, but the facts are clearly in dispute as to how he was treated since the day he left. There -- there's just no question about that.

Doesn't -- as I've said, I'm not saying he's

going to win, but are there material facts in dispute where I can conclude he has no claim against your clients; no there are not. Clearly there is a question, a lot of questions.

So I think it's -- I think one and two remain. I'll go through the complaint in a minute. I mean, I know it's nice to grant Summary Judgment, but Summary Judgment can't be granted if there's material facts in dispute. So let's look specifically at the different counts.

Okay, oppression; seems to me there is a potential claim there. It remains. That's count one. Count two, abuse of authority and breach of fiduciary duty; lots of facts in dispute over that one. That remains. Breach of the Operating Agreement; I agree with you, count three should be dismissed. There is no evidence of a breach of the agreement. Accounting; I'm not sure about that one, whether he's been provided — I know you say he has been but let's — I'll hear from him on count four.

Civil conspiracy against third parties; I guess that remains. It's a derivative claim out of one and two. Defamation; that remains. There's evidence that your guy said he's -- he's a thief. Maybe that's true, maybe not. Your brief just says, "Judge you have

to prove damages, the law supports that." Well, what law supports that? In fact the laws go the opposite way and I can't remember the name of the case but the Initials versus Initials case says that in certain cases you don't have to prove damages. So that remains.

Defamatory entry to reputation; I think that's really the same as six, so that remains. So, breach of contract I get, but -- and I don't know about the accounting so, but the rest are valid claims.

Are they going to be found in his favor, I have no idea. But when someone says you got fired because he was a thief; is that defamatory. Maybe, I don't know. Is he a thief? You're going to have to prove he's not I guess, or he is I suppose. But those are valid claims.

I don't know why we're not seeing eye to eye -- well I do know because you've got a job to do for your client but if you say -- if you tell the world or tell outside people that someone's been terminated because they're a thief, it has to be true; right? Right.

Okay, so what else do I need to know?

MR. NAGLE: That's it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Tell me about the accounting now.

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30 1 What's your position on that? MR. NAGLE: Well, in discovery in this case 2 3 we've produced all of the financial information that we have for the company. 4 THE COURT: Okay. 5 6 MR. NAGLE: Which would include, you know, 7 the books and records, so --THE COURT: Okay, well let's hear from him. 8 MR. NAGLE: -- I mean it's not a formal 9 10 accounting per say as one would call it. But it -- our view is he has the information. 11 THE COURT: Okay. So, what's -- I didn't 12 13 give you a chance to speak, so I guess I should give 14 you a chance now. MR. ULRICH: Thank you, Your Honor. With 15 16 regards to the accounting, the last information I 17 received pertaining to the finances of the company was March of 2000 and -- we're in '15 -- 2014 and that was 18 19 due to a discovery request. Since that time I've 20 received nothing with regards -- I have no -- I have no 21 idea how the company is operating financially, what 22 they -- you know, whether they are succeeding.

> THE COURT: All right. So I guess since there's facts in dispute, I guess it remains a claim

completely in the dark as I was prior to discovery.

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24

1	unless you can rebut that. Has he gotten anything
2	since the spring of 2014?
3	MR. NAGLE: There there additional
4	information was provided over the summer but it hasn't
5	been updated to date; no.
6	THE COURT: Okay. All right, I guess you're
7	the last last Indian standing, last person standing
8	I suppose. You also filed a Motion.
9	MR. ULRICH: Did I file a motion?
10	MR. FIALCOWITZ: You just cross-moved with
11	regard to our claims,
12	THE COURT: I mean, if we are where we are, I
13	
14	MR. ULRICH: I'd like your guidance on this
15	because I'm not sure that
16	THE COURT: Well, I can't give you any
17	guidance.
18	MR. ULRICH: Well
19	THE COURT: You've asked for an Order
20	Granting Summary Judgment in your favor and dismissing
21	the complaint entirely as to you. You've asked me to
22	throw his case against you out.
23	MR. ULRICH: Okay. So it's been versus
24	the the John, Teresa, you know, and Phoenix
25	that's that's been set aside

1 THE COURT: You and he are in it, that's it. 2 MR. ULRICH: Okay. 3 THE COURT: Do you mind standing? I tend to 4 be --5 MR. ULRICH: Oh, I'm sorry --THE COURT: -- it's all right. I tend to be 6 7 kind of formal. 8 MR. ULRICH: I apologize. 9 THE COURT: Not a problem. MR. ULRICH: So I quess I'll refer to my 10 11 brief? Let's see -- I'm just going to -- lump one --12 one and two; enforcement of restrictive covenant and 13 breach of fiduciary duty. I believe I reference some 14 information that was provided in the -- information 15 that was provided by -- by Phoenix through John 16 Fialcowitz. With regards to my -- my fiduciary 17 responsibility, I haven't violated that in any way. 18 I haven't had any contact -- any contact or 19 -- no interest in Phoenix Transcription. But if I were 20 to have any finance -- fiduciary responsibility, I 21 would think that we would have to take into 22 consideration that fact that I've received basically no 23 -- no information; financial or distributions from the 24 day that I was released as a manager to present.

THE COURT: Okay, well as I see counts one

1 and two, you still remain a member of the plaintiff --2 MR. ULRICH: Okay. 3 THE COURT: -- they're saying you conspired 4 with the now removed defendants and that the evidence 5 of that is that you've got some payments from them. That suggests there's a claim here that needs to be 6 7 flushed out I think. MR. ULRICH: Okay. Since -- since my -- my 8 9 release from King Transcription, I've had no source of 10 In my family, when -- when a member becomes on income. 11 hardship, family members chip-in to support and help. 12 And that's basically what the funds are that are coming 13 from --14 THE COURT: Okay, but that's -- that's a fact that needs to be decided at a trial. 15 16 MR. ULRICH: Okay. 17 THE COURT: You got money from them, they say 18 it's because of your participating with them --19 MR. ULRICH: Right. THE COURT: -- you say it was loans. 20 I can't 21 make a decision --22 MR. ULRICH: Okay. 23 THE COURT: -- based upon just submissions. 24 I have to hear testimony, evidence. I mean, I think 25 count five, mis-appropriation of trade secrets; since

there's no trade secrets, I don't know how you could 1 mis-appropriate them. So I suppose count five is worth 2 3 -- is appropriate to dismiss. 4 MR. ULRICH: Okay. THE COURT: Having previously concluded that 5 there's no trade secrets. 6 7 MR. ULRICH: I mean, respectfully, Your Honor, the information put forth by John Fialcowitz, 8 9 representing Phoenix --10 THE COURT: Right. 11 MR. ULRICH: -- I believe applies to my 12 situation equally. I mean it's -- although --13 THE COURT: Well, there's a couple 14 differences. You did sign a restrictive covenant 15 contract --16 MR. ULRICH: Okay. 17 THE COURT: -- and you still are a member of 18 the plaintiff, so there are some legal distinctions 19 between you and them, for those two reasons at least. 20 MR. ULRICH: Okay. So what counts do we have 21 still standing then? 22 THE COURT: Well, the only one that I've --23 that I so far ruled is five; trade secrets because I 24 ruled in his case that there were no trade secrets, 25 that all this is public information.

1	MR. ULRICH: All right.
2	THE COURT: But I'm still open to hearing
3	what you think and give Mr. Nagle a chance to talk
4	also.
5	MR. ULRICH: With regard to trade secrets
6	well that's that's already been ruled.
7	THE COURT: That's done.
8	MR. ULRICH: Okay.
9	THE COURT: All the other counts. If you
LO	think it's warranted that there are no material facts
L1	in dispute, that they can prove any of the other
L2	counts, this is the time to tell me.
L3	MR. ULRICH: I'm at a loss here. Can you
L 4	give me a second please?
L5	THE COURT: Of course.
L6	MR. ULRICH: All right; thanks.
L 7	THE COURT: Would you like me to step down so
L8	you don't feel like I'm watching you?
L9	MR. ULRICH: No, that's all right.
20	THE COURT: All right, why don't we take a
21	break, I'm sure you don't need me sitting here watching
22	you
23	MR. ULRICH: I appreciate that.
24	THE COURT: just let me know when you're
25	ready.

1 MR. ULRICH: All right. (Off the record. Back on the record) 2 3 THE COURT: Okay. Yes, sir? MR. ULRICH: Your Honor, I believe in my 5 brief, for these counts I've cited -- referred to the 6 Fialcowitz brief and I just rely on that. 7 THE COURT: Okay. 8 MR. ULRICH: All right. 9 THE COURT: Sounds good, sir. Mr. Nagle? 10 MR. NAGLE: Your Honor, I don't have anything 11 further. 12 THE COURT: Okay, well various counts -- let 13 me back up a minute. There is an agreement, an 14 enforceable restrictive covenant between the plaintiff 15 and Mr. Ulrich. And the plaintiff wishes to enforce 16 that and there's material facts in dispute as to 17 whether he did or did not violate that. 18 On the usurpation of corporate opportunity, 19 the same -- the same is true. There are facts in 20 dispute as to whether the defendant caused the 21 plaintiff to suffer damages. 22 In terms of breach of fiduciary duty, of good 23 faith and loyalty to King. It -- it's an interesting 24 issue because as a member -- as a -- one of the

three owners, that creates a duty and I don't know of

any case that talks about the issues when two members fire the third as an employee; does that affect the duty of loyalty. I don't know, interesting question but that's in count three.

Count four, breach of covenant of good faith;

Count four, breach of covenant of good faith; same thing. Mis-appropriation of trade secrets; since there were no trade secrets, that is dismissed as I've previously indicated.

Tortious interference with business relations; well he's -- the plaintiff is asserting that this defendant interfered with the plaintiff's ability to continue doing business, I guess, and participated in stealing clients improperly. Again, I think there's material facts in dispute as to that one.

And conversion -- let me ask Mr. Nagle, what is it that it's alleged he converted because I'm not clear?

MR. NAGLE: It was some of our software, Your Honor. We put in our papers that -- the first invoice --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. NAGLE: -- that was generated by Phoenix was the last invoice number -- next number up --

THE COURT: 30,000; whatever it was, yeah.

MR. NAGLE: -- correct. So that tracking

software and accounting software has -- contains propriet -- we claim it contains proprietary information or at least information with regard to our clients, even if it's not proprietary, it is information with regard to our clients.

THE COURT: Well, there's not much in here to really deal with that issue but I guess since there's an allegation and there's no material -- no rebuttal to -- at this point to that. That remains.

And unfair competition; I guess that stays too. So at least as to Mr. Ulrich, count five goes.

Okay, anything else gentlemen? All right, it seems like we have an interesting situation here. You have a defendant who is an owner of the plaintiff who at least intuitively might be deserving -- let me start that again. There is no plan on the table to remove -- to get him off as a member. That's the strange thing here I -- that I don't understand and at least there's nothing in this litigation, so it seems like he may have claims against the plaintiff as a member.

It seems like you may have claims against him for violating the restrictive covenant. Sounds like that's a basis to talk turkey and try and get this resolved to me. Hey, who am I?

MR. NAGLE: On the record or off the record,

Your Honor -- I mean -- if you want -- I think if we go 1 off the record I'll -- I can -- I'll -- I'll tell you 2 how I view practically going forward. 3 4 THE COURT: Well I can't do that because he's 5 pro se --MR. NAGLE: Okay. 6 THE COURT: 7 -- so. MR. NAGLE: I think as a practical matter, in 8 9 light of what happened here today, I think the 10 opportunity to resolve those issues as Your Honor has 11 suggested is --12 THE COURT: It's seems like it might be worth 13 while. 14 MR. NAGLE: -- is a --THE COURT: You don't mind, right? Okay, 15 16 sounds good. Give me a couple of minutes to do the 17 orders and then we'll see you in March if you're still 18 involved. 19 MR. FIALCOWITZ: Thank you, Your Honor. 20 MR. ULRICH: Thank you, Your Honor. 21 THE COURT: Thank you. 22 MR. NAGLE: Thanks, Judge. 23 (Proceeding Concluded at 2:12 p.m.) 24

CERTIFICATION

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