
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Adenah Bayoh



SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY CHANCERY DIVISION: ESSEX COUNTY DOCKET NO.: ESX-C-226-11

ESTATE OF ADEKUNLE ALLI, by ADENIKE ALLI, Administrator,

Plaintiff,

VS.

ADENAH BAYOH, ABKA HOLDINGS, LLC, KWAY PROPERTIES, LLC, NEW CAPITAL INVESTORS, LLC and MIDGROVE PROPERTIES, LLC,

Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION

ORDER DENYING MOTION
TO APPOINT RECEIVER AND
GRANTING CROSS-MOTION TO
DISMISS COUNT I OF THE
VERIFIED COMPLAINT
WITHOUT PREJUDICE

THIS MATTER, having been opened to the Court upon the motion of Paul M. Bangiola, Esq., attorney for Plaintiff Estate of Adekunle Alli, by Adenike Alli, Administrator (the "Estate"), for an Order pursuant to N.J.S.A. §14A:12-7 to appoint a receiver for Defendants ABKA Holding, LLC, KWAY Properties, LLC, New Capital Investors, LLC, and Midgrove Properties, LLC (the "Limited Liability Companies"); and upon the cross-motion of John Fialcowitz, Esq., attorney for Defendant Adenah Bayoh for an Order dismissing Count I of the

Verified Complaint; and the Court having considered the parties' submissions and oral argument and for good cause shown,

IT IS on this the 3 day of Morcula, 2011,

ORDERED as follows:

- 1. The Estate's motion to appoint a receiver for the Limited Liability Companies is denied. WHVOUT PLEIVOCE:
- 2. The cross-motion of Defendant Adenah Bayoh ("Adenah") is granted and Count I of the Verified Complaint is dismissed without prejudice.
- 3. The Estate's request for interim relief in the amount of \$50,000.00 for counsel and accounting fees is denied.
- 4. The Estate shall serve John Fialcowitz, Esq., Adenah's counsel, with its requests for financial records within five (5) days of its receipt of a copy of this Order.
- 5. Mr. Fialcowitz shall respond to the Estate's requests for records within thirty (30) days of receipt of the Estate's demands and after entry of an appropriate Protective Order.
- 6. Mr. Fialcowitz shall prepare a proposed Stipulated Protective Order to protect the confidentiality of the information exchanged between the parties, and the parties will work together to prepare a proposed form of Order to present to the Court.
- 7. Adenah shall reinstate the bi-weekly payments to Adenike Alli in the amount previously paid as shown on the records contained in Exhibit 21 of Adenah's October 24, 2011 Certification, and these payments shall continue until further Order of the Court.

8. Adenah shall have sole authority to manage the business and affairs of the Limited Liability Companies until further Order of the Court, subject to her duty to provide the financial information requested by the Estate as described above.

9. A case management conference shall be held before the Court on December 15 2011. At 1:30 p.m.

10. Mr. Fialcowitz shall serve a copy of this Order on all parties within Tdays.

Hon. Walter Koprowski, Jr., J.S.C.

This motion was:

opposed.

11. Application to intervene filed by TRICOMITY & AND RIGHTONI ROPATY CORP 15 DAVES COURT CONSIDERED THE OBjections to the PORM OF THE ORDER.

REASONS pluet in the Reend.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY CHANCERY DIVISION, PROBATE PART ESSEX COUNTY DOCKET NO. C-226-11 A.D.# 1 2 ESTATE OF ALLI, 3 Plaintiff, TRANSCRIPT 4 OF vs. ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 5 HEARING BAYOH, ET AL., 6 Defendant. 7 8 Essex County Courthouse Place: 212 Washington St.. 9 Newark, New Jersey 07102 10 Date: October 27, 2011 11 BEFORE: 12 HONORABLE WALTER KOPROWSKI, JR., J.S.C. 13 TRANSCRIPT ORDERED BY: 14 15 JOHN A. FIALCOWITZ, ESQ. (Law Office of John A. Fialcowitz) 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

1	APPEARANCES:
2	PAUL M. BANGIOLA, ESQ.
3	(Bangiola Law Office) Attorney for the Plaintiff
4	JOHN A. FIALCOWITZ, ESQ.
5	(Law Office of John A. Fialcowitz) Attorney for the Defendant
6	
7	NICHOLAS J. CANOVA, ESQ. (Fein, Such, Kahn & Shepard)
8	Attorney for the Interveners, Bank of America
9	TIMOTHY J. FORD, ESQ. (Einhorn, Harris, Ascher, Barbarito & Frost)
10	Attorney for the Interveners, Creditors
11	Barran Charres M. Dachman
12	Transcriber, Sherry M. Bachmann G&L TRANSCRIPTION OF NJ
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1	THE COURT: This is the matter of 226-11
2	docket. This is the return date of an order to show
3	cause. My name is Judge Koprowski, and what I'm going
4	to do now is, first, ask Counsel to please enter your
5	appearances.
6	MR. BANGIOLA: For the plaintiff, Estate of
7	Alli, Paul M. Bangiola, B-a-n-g-i-o-l-a.
8	THE COURT: Thank you.
9	MR. FIALCOWITZ: Your Honor, good morning.
10	John Fialcowitz for defendant, Adina (phonetic) Bayou.
11	THE COURT: Thank you. We have Counsel here,
12	who are seeking to intervene. Counsel, do you want to
13	enter your appearances.
14	MR. CANOVA: Nicholas Canova from Fein, Such,
15	Kahn & Shepard on behalf of the Bank of America.
16	MR. FORD: Timothy Ford, Your Honor, from
17	Einhorn, Harris, Ascher, Barbarito & Frost on behalf of
18	creditors in a related and pending matter before Judge
19	Levy.
20	THE COURT: All right. Then Mr. Leiberman
21	was here and appearing on behalf of Tricominus
22	(phonetic), I guess it is, and he was he's also
23	filed some papers, but he's not here.
24	MR. FORD: Your Honor, he asked me to advise
25	Your Honor that he had to leave, remind Your Honor that

he had submitted a certification with respect to his position and he apologized he needed to leave.

THE COURT: All right. So I guess, in terms of procedure and maybe I'll -- let's do this. Let me hear the order to show cause first, and then I'll hear the application to intervene in this matter. I know that it may impact what relief I grant on the order to show cause, but -- actually, maybe it's better to hear the motion to intervene first because Mr. Ford and Mr. Canova know where they stand as far as their position on this application. So why don't we reverse that.

Mr. Ford, Mr. Canova, why don't you come forward and I'll let you argue your application and then we'll hear from -- then I'll hear from Mr. Fialcowitz and Mr. Bangiola as far as the intervention is concerned.

MR. FORD: Your Honor, as Your Honor is aware, what I've termed as the Rigatoni plaintiffs in a pending matter in foreclosure that's being handled by Judge Levy is requested to intervene under Rule 4:33-1. The Rigatoni plaintiffs, Your Honor, are creditors of the Estate of Adaculi (phonetic) Alli, and they are creditors directly of Adina Bayou and New Capital Investors.

There is a consent order -- there's been multiple consent orders before Judge Levy, the primary

one of which was consent order from September 23rd, 2009, where there is a baseline, at least some of \$283,500 that is due by the Estate of Adaculi Alli, Adina Bayou, and New Capital Investors. There is a September 23rd, 2009, consent order. That number is also reflected in a July 8th, 2011, consent order that was executed by Judge Levy and I believe it may have been involved or reflected in a July of 2010 consent order.

You know, this is a minimum sum certain. The Rigatoni plaintiffs are also seeking other relief in those matters, including attorneys' fees and interest pursuant to the consent order. The Rigatoni plaintiffs, I had filed an application for Judge Levy in October, 2011, for interest only payments as it relates to the consent orders, Your Honor.

The Adina Bayou and New Capital Investors, through their attorney, Mark Davis, both himself and the Rigatoni plaintiffs executed a consent order, which is pending before Judge Levy and I know Judge Levy wanted me to raise that issue before Your Honor today. The Judge indicated that he would sign off on the consent order, I guess, pending what happens before Your Honor today.

Just to be as brief as I can, Your Honor, the

1.3

Rigatoni plaintiffs are creditors. They are interested in several of the properties that are at play in this matter. New Capital Investors, which is a defendant in this matter, is a defendant in our action and jointly and severally owes an obligation to my clients in at least the amount of \$283,500.

THE COURT: So why -- why should I permit you to intervene in basically what amounts to a dispute between the Estate and the member of the various entities? Aren't you getting involved in a governance kind of a situation? And why get involved -- why should I let you be involved in the dispute between the two members? What's the basis for that, Mr. Ford?

MR. FORD: Your Honor, you know, my clients are creditors of all of the relevant parties in this matter. You know, it's our position that, since 2008, all of the parties that are involved in the matter before Your Honor have done nothing but to delay and to prejudice the rights of the Rigatoni plaintiffs. Some of the properties that are involved, Your Honor, in the matter that's pending in this action are related to the properties that are the subject of the September 23rd, 2009, consent order.

THE COURT: I understand all that. But, I mean, if you enter in, I mean, what are you going to

do? Aside from protecting your interest in the property, you can't dissolve the -- I don't think you have the statutory right to seek dissolution of the LLCs or to seek some kind of a modification of the management of the LLC. Really, you're a creditor and you have an interest in the property, but that doesn't give you an interest in the management of the LLC.

MR. FORD: Your Honor, my clients are not seeking any involvement in the management or dissolution of any of the entities. They're simply taking the position that they're interested parties. Depending on Your Honor's order as it relates to a receiver being appointed, my clients are creditors of the Estate of Alli and Adina Bayou and New Capital Investors.

One of the nuances, Your Honor, is, our consent order in the amount of 238,500 that has not been reduced to a formal judgment and docketed as a lien with the State of New Jersey. Judge Levy has ordered that certain procedural mechanisms take place before that occurs. For example, in my matter, Your Honor, without getting into too much detail, there is a property that is now owned by court order by my client, which is to be sold in a procedure that was put in place by Judge Levy.

Until that happens, Judge Levy has said that the Rigatoni plaintiffs should not file the consent order and have it docketed as a lien in the State of New Jersey. So one of the issues, Your Honor, is, although there are mortgages related to some of the properties that are involved in both actions, it has not yet been reduced to a formal judgment. There is a consent — there is multiple consent orders, but there's been nothing that's been recorded as a lien in the State of New Jersey pending the procedural mechanisms that are ongoing.

But it's not our position that we want to be involved in a fight over the control or ownership of the entities or, you know, we're not seeking to dissolve the entities. Your Honor, I think, essentially, the Rigatoni plaintiffs want to be aware as to what is going on in that matter than to be kept abreast of everything that's occurring.

THE COURT: So if I consolidated the matters, wouldn't that accomplish what your goal is? In other words, you would know what's going on -- consolidate it for discovery purposes and we've kept you -- you would be in the mix as far as that goes, but you really wouldn't be a party who -- or intervener in the underlying lawsuit. No?

1	MR. FORD: I suppose, Your Honor, that may
2	accomplish you know, accomplish what the Rigatoni
3	plaintiffs are seeking. My only one concern is the
4	fact that, although the consent orders are in place and
5	they've been signed by the Judge, that they have not
6	been reduced to a lien and that cannot be done at this
7	point. I would do that, but that cannot be done until
8	we finish the one mechanism set forth in Judge Levy's
9	July 8th, 2011, order. So that's one area of concern
10	that I do have, just so that it's recognized as a claim
11	of both the plaintiff in this matter and the
12	defendants, Adina Bayou and New Capital Investors.
13	THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Mr.
14	Canova, you don't want your case consolidated. I know
15	that.
16	MR. CANOVA: Correct, Your Honor. It seems,
17	based on what we heard before, that it's basically an
18	accounting issue and we have a pretty plain vanilla
19	foreclosure and we would accept reinstatement or payoff
20	at any time when they come to any sort of agreement.
21	But their claims have not much to do with the .
22	foreclosure action.
23	THE COURT: So what's your position as far as
24	what involvement do you seek in this case?
25	MR. CANOVA: Zero involvement.

1 THE COURT: You don't -- anything. 2 MR. CANOVA: I'm just here to make sure it's 3 not consolidated -- our foreclosure isn't consolidated 4 into this action. 5 THE COURT: All right. Well, there's no 6 application to consolidate at the moment. Mr. Ford 7 wants to intervene, but I don't really understand how 8 or why he should be -- his client should be allowed to 9 intervene in this action. Let's hear from -- let's 10 hear from plaintiff first. Mr. Bangiola? 11 MR. BANGIOLA: Thank you, Your Honor. 12 this action, the plaintiff, Estate of Alli, is --13 THE COURT: Do you want to address the 14 interven-- the application to intervene? 15 MR. BANGIOLA: Oh, the intervention? 16 THE COURT: Yes. 17 MR. BANGIOLA: On the intervention issue, I 18 think, in Mr. Ford's case and, I think, actually, in 19 the case of the Bank of America as well, they are 20 reacting to something that was in my pleadings where I 21 pointed out to the Court and I actually seek the relief 22 of the receiver to higher Counsel and manage these 23 three pieces of litigation, which in the best interests 24 of the companies and in the best interests of my 25 client, the Estate, so that instead of having three

lawyers, one lawyer, same lawyer in three different
cases managing those cases with these creditors, a
single receiver can actually marshal the rents that are
really the things that need to be marshaled to resolve
these cases and to resolve those litigations, their
foreclosures before we lose another property.

Mr. Ford's client has succeeded in obtaining title to a property in the face of lots of litigation that should not have happened, in my opinion, and shouldn't have occurred and that part of that is because the Estate is simultaneously — I'm sorry — the manager, Ms. Bayou, and her attorney are simultaneously fighting and protecting themselves from the Estate. At the same time, they should be in common with us dealing with the creditors, and it could be much more sensibly resolved, if there was a neutral manager of those litigations in the form of a receiver, and that's why in my papers I suggested a receiver should take over all three of those cases —

THE COURT: And what's your position on his application to intervene?

MR. BANGIOLA: Well, I think -- he didn't mention this, but I'm seeking relief from the companies, interim relief, and I would suspect that, you know, I want to go to the front of the line on

that. I want to see if my client can get persuade
Your Honor for some interim relief and that conceivably
and other remedies that we put in place here, if the
Court were to agree with my application, could
conceivably affect the interest of creditors because
people are going to start getting paid, if that were to
happen. That's where I would say they might have an
interest. I think it's all going to be I
respectfully submit it's necessary, but I can see where
they would have an interest in things like compensating
receivers and lawyers and managing litigations because
those are expenses that are going to be incurred.
I think, when it comes to the other issues,
I'll address whether I think that's reasonable compared
to the costs that are being incurred now. But I think
it's a reasonable way to proceed and to include them
here will actually be in their interests in trying to
resolve their claims in a business-like way with a
single decision maker instead of all sides being played
against the middle here.
THE COURT: So wouldn't it be better just to
consolidate the actions then?
MR. BANGIOLA: It would it would be a fine

result. That would be a good outcome. At least, we

wouldn't have -- and I found out in the papers

1 yesterday some more details. It's actually four Essex 2 County cases, not three. I didn't realize that until I saw Mr. Davis' certification yesterday that the fourth 3 4 one is still pending and it's in this courthouse and 5 this doesn't seem to make sense because it's all going 6 to come out of the same pocket, I believe, if these 7 cases have to be resolved, and my client's interest is 8 in not losing anymore properties. 9 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 10 your position on that, Mr. Fialcowitz? 11 MR. FIALCOWITZ: Your Honor, to start off, if 12 I could, I made copies of all the relevant sections of 13 the LLC Act, loaded them into binders and made enough 14 binders for everyone, and it's important in my 15 presentation today, if I could give copies to everybody 16 just to follow along with the statute, which I think 17 controls all the issues in this case. Could I present 18 that to the Court? 19 THE COURT: I have no objection. 20 objection, Counsel? No? Go ahead. 21 MR. FIALCOWITZ: Okay. Thank you. Because I 22 think, Your Honor, when we look at the applicable law 23 and it's clearly an equitable maxim that equity follows 24 the law, that the law says that the so-called creditors

have no standing here today. They have no standing to

1 intervene.

Now, put aside the fact that under Rule 4:33-3, a motion to intervene, even as a right, has to be made on notice of motion by motion, which they did not do. They're supposed to present a form of pleading that gives us a sense as to what their interest is. They didn't do that.

Mr. Bangiola put them on notice of his application by e-mail dated October 4th. They waited until October 25th to file their application. If it was so urgent -- and all these events that were talked about occurred in 2009. Why wasn't the application to appoint a receiver made in 2009? And on top of that, now, I hear it's not even reduced to a judgment.

But the most important thing for Your Honor to focus on with regard to this motion to intervene is the LLC Act itself. And if you could turn with me to Tab 5, okay? In Tab 5, I have included this statute because, as I said, I think when we go through this today, the LLC Act addresses, basically, every issue that's presented today and this talks about the rights of judgment creditors, and it's N.J.S.A. 42:2B-45, and the pertinent part I would like the Court to look at is the fourth sentence down.

It says, "a court order charging the limited

1	liability company interests of a member pursuant to
2	this section shall be the sole remedy of a judgment
3	creditor." We don't even have a judgment creditor yet
4	because I just heard Mr. Ford say, it hasn't been
5	reduced to a judgment and a lien hasn't been entered.
6	"Shall be the sole remedy of a judgment creditor who
7	shall have no right under the LLC Act" that's what
8	all these statutory citations are referencing "or
9	any other state law" and this is the critical part
10	"to interfere with the management or force
11	dissolution of the limited liability company or to seek
12	an order of the Court requiring foreclosure share of
13	the limited liability company interest."
14	No right to interfere with the management.
15	They have joined an application to intervene to appoint
16	a receiver to do the management of these LLC companies,
17	and I would submit to the Court that this statute
18	prohibits that from intervening in this action. So,
19	accordingly, we would ask that the Court deny the
20 ·	application.
21	THE COURT: All right. Thanks. Any reply,
22	Mr. Bangiola, on this issue?
23	MR. BANGIOLA: Well, we're seeking
24	appointment of a receiver, which would affect their
25	interests and we believe that the reason the receiver

is necessary in one sense is because the assets are being depleted and we're losing our equity in the companies we own because of the management of the companies and we need the extraordinary remedies of --

THE COURT: So why let them in the case? I mean, what's their interest in the case, if it's a battle between the Estate of the former member and the present member?

MR. BANGIOLA: Well, they need to have -- I suppose, they need to have their claims accounted for as part of whatever resolution is achieved between us because one thing we know is that we've got two 50 percent entities and those rights have to be sorted out by the Court and, when that happens, things could happen in terms of payments, judgments, and we would -- we have an interest and they have an interest both in having everything wrapped up, so that everyone knows where they stand in one place. Maybe the entire controversy doctrine, if nothing else.

THE COURT: All right. I understand. Thank you. I'm going to deny the application to intervene filed by Mr. Ford. I must say, Mr. Lieberman also joined in that application, while Mr. Canova hasn't, and I understand. I'm not stuck on the procedural requirements here. I allowed this order to show cause

to be served on short notice based on Mr. Bangiola's request and his argument that there was a need to address these issues on an expedited basis because of the ongoing business and the collection of rents and et cetera. So I kind of set up a short return date.

That put Mr. Ford and Mr. Lieberman and Mr. Canova's client in a spot where they, obviously, couldn't file a motion in the normal timeframe and they filed these papers alerting the Court to the fact that they sought to intervene. I'm going to deny the motion, the application to intervene.

I don't -- I think Mr. Fialcowitz is right.

I think that they -- while they may have an interest, as Mr. Bangiola says, in the outcome here because, obviously, what happens may set up a priority of payment or may establish what assets are available. On the other hand, they don't have a judgment and it seems to me that the statute does indicate 42:2B-45, that the judgment creditor has no right to interfere with the management or force dissolution of a limited liability company or seek an order of the Court requiring a foreclosure sale of the limited liability company interest.

So it seems to me that what I have here, essentially, is a dispute between the two members, the

Estate of Mr. Alli and the defendant, Ms. Bayou, who are the two members in this limited liability corporation. And while, again, I concede that there's an interest, I don't think it's the same interest that the creditors have. The interest between these two members is to resolve the management of the LLC and/or the payment of the Estate's interest or payment to the Estate of the value of its interest in the LLC.

The interest of these corp-- of Mr. Ford's client, Mr. Canova's client, and Mr. Lieberman's client can be paid by the LLC, but it's a different interest, it seems to me, than the battle between the principals here. I am -- it may be that they should -- these cases should be consolidated, so that they all move forward together, not that we want to delay Mr. Canova's case if he doesn't want consolidation, but it may be that if we get them all together, then at least it would solve Mr. Ford's concern that his client know what's going on.

But there will be -- judgment in this matter, in his case, doesn't have a right under the statute, it seems to me, to get involved in the management or the dissolution of the limited liability company. So I'm not going to allow intervention in this case, and I'm basing that on 42:2B-45. Now, -- and if Mr. Ford

1 thinks an application is appropriate, he can make an 2 application for consolidation, file a motion and I'll 3 hear it and I'll make a determination. 4 MR. FORD: Your Honor, just if I may, the one other issue that Judge Levy, his chambers wanted me to 5 6 address and I mentioned it when I addressed Your Honor, 7 was the issue of the consent order that's pending before Judge Levy, which all parties have signed off 8 9 It's been submitted to Judge Levy. I didn't know if he was going to address that with you or if the two 10 11 Judges would, but I know Judge Levy was seeking 12 direction from Your Honor with respect to that. 13 THE COURT: Yes. I know about that, and I'll 14 address that after we finish the hearing today. 15 MR. FORD: And, Your Honor, just the one 16 final thing was, part of my application, in addition to 17 seeking intervention and I will probably make a 18 consolidation motion is to just give Your Honor a 19 little bit of background and procedural information as 20 to what has happened in our matter as well, and it's a part of Mr. Bangiola's application. 21 22 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Ford. 23 MR. FORD: Thank you. 24 THE COURT: I appreciate it. Mr. Canova,

thank you. Gentlemen, you're excused, if you don't

want to wait around for this. Certainly, we're happy
to have you here, but you're also excused if you would
like to be excused from the rest of the proceeding.

All right?

MR. FORD: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Let's hear

THE COURT: Thank you. Let's hear from -well, I guess, I'll go back to Mr. Bangiola. It's your
application. I'll hear from you, and then I'll hear
from Mr. Fialcowitz. All right?

MR. BANGIOLA: Thank you, sir. I don't want to reargue my papers. I can tell Your Honor has reviewed them carefully, and they are copious, both sides. I — my client is the Estate of the decedent who died this year in February. He died in testate. He left behind business interests, which his widow did not know about the nature or the extent of virtually all of his business relationships, except for the fact that his business partner was Ms. Bayou.

I started, after my client was appointed administrator in Middlesex County, by writing to the business partner, asking her to explain and account to me for what the Estate's interest in these companies was and, from there, we have had a very bumpy journey. I didn't get a response in writing to the letter I wrote to her in April until the middle of June, and

that letter was from the first lawyer I dealt with, a
Charlene Davis, and it set forth various assets, which
were triggers to my client's memory to some extent, but
the nature of the decedent's ownership interest in
these companies has, to a large extent, been dependent
upon -- our understanding, was dependent upon
information provided by Ms. Bayou.

When I contacted the accountant for the companies, I quickly encountered a stonewall. Ms. Bayou then changed Counsel, and I took the issue of the accountant's records up with her and I got an authorization from Ms. Bayou to get those records from the accountant, but I didn't have a filed action and when I served the authorization, we still didn't get any records from the accountant.

We tried valiantly to resolve the issues as best we could without having to seek the Court's assistance because, from very early on, it became clear that there were creditors and there are substantial assets that have capital value and there's substantial income from various rental properties and from an IHOP restaurant and that it made far more sense to try to resolve these matters with the business partner who was in control of these entities than to seek the Court's assistance for a variety of reasons. That would be

wasteful of the State's assets and wasteful of the company's assets. So we take this step very, very reluctantly.

What pushed us over the edge was, while we have been trying to resolve these matters, the interim distributions that were not going to the Estate, as probably they should have but were being made in the form of salary checks, which makes — is really not good accounting, but that was the way it was done of approximately \$3,600 every two weeks, was being paid to my client, Mrs. Alli, from February and, in the heat of the discussions or — for whatever reason, we received notice that those payments were considered courtesy payments and would be terminated as of September 1st.

That was when we were dealing with Ms.

Bayou's third attorney since April. I've been dealing with Charlene Davis, Esq., Mark Davis, Esq., and then when Robyne LaGrotta entered the case, we had a long meeting at my office, followed by an explosion of the negotiations and then Ms. LaGrotta advised me in early August -- and I think it's attached to our papers -- that the courtesy payment would be stopped as of September 1st.

I frantically tried to resolve that with Ms.

LaGrotta before September 1st. In that period of time,

the rents -- the rent collector for years on all of these various properties that are owned by these four defendant LLCs were all collected by one person, who was the decedent's son. Now, for whatever reason, the decedent's son was terminated and Ms. Bayou as of September 1 started taking -- notified all the tenants that she was collecting the rents and all the rents have been collected by Ms. Bayou, all of them. We don't know how they're being applied. We do know that as of September 1, my client, the widow's means of support have utterly stopped and she was dependent upon those prior distributions.

The Estate has repeatedly -- repeatedly and incessantly asked for a detailed or even a general statement of the salary that Ms. Bayou draws from any of these companies, the distributions that are made to Ms. Bayou for any of these companies, and we have not received that as of today. We still don't have that. We don't know if or how much Ms. Bayou is being paid, but we trust that she is not working for the IHOP restaurant owned by the defendant, ABKA Holdings, for free, nor would we expect her to.

We do not know what her distributions are.

We do know from some discovery, some exchange of information we did get, we do know that the rents from

four different LLCs are being put into a single account by New Capital Investors, one of the four defendants and that, from that, Ms. Bayou uses that money as she sees fit, to pay obligations not necessarily for each individual LLC but as she -- I guess, as she needs to. We don't really have detailed information on that.

There should be money available to have satisfied four different creditors in four different litigations. We did get a statement that is before the Court that shows receipts into a New Capital checking account for April, 2011, for rents for approximately \$52,000. This \$52,000 is completely independent of whatever income is generated from the IHOP restaurant. The only information we obtained for the IHOP restaurant stopped as of the receipt of a W-2 to the Estate showing that the decedent received approximately \$79,000 on W-2 income for 2010.

We have no financial indication as to what the total revenue was for the company for 2010, nor do we have anything on it for 2011. We don't have any indication of what Ms. Bayou is paying herself. We don't have any indication what distribution she has paid to herself.

Now, as Your Honor can see from the opposition papers and leaving aside much extraneous

information, which I submit is contained in that, it is very clear that Ms. Bayou as a 50 percent owner is not acknowledging any rights on the part of the Estate to understand the assets that are under her care that she is not accounting to us in any way, shape, or form, that she is intentionally directing attorneys not to communicate with the Estate, that the attorneys are confirming that in writing, that the accountants are not providing information to us, and that the assets of these companies are being deployed by her against the co-owner of those companies.

Now, I would not that there are some things that are in common in our briefs. At Page 27, you have to read a long way to get to this point, but at Page 27 of Ms. Bayou's brief, she acknowledges this. She acknowledges that the threatened destruction of a business constitutes irreparable harm. We agree with that. We agree with that.

We think that all four of these LLCs are threatened with destruction, and we believe that's the case because three of them -- New Capital and Mid-Grove Properties are facing foreclosures against their properties in relatively small amounts. We have tenants in these properties who are paying rent, but Bank of America's mortgages was \$150,000. On its face,

it seems that there should be -- with \$52,000 of income from rents, there should be enough to have managed, certainly, a mortgage payment on a piece of property that's currently rented.

We have that example. We have the continuing problem of ABKA Holdings, which owns the IHOP. It is very important to note that, while we received one letter on June 13th that said we owned, yes, the Estate owns half of the IHOP or the decedent owns half of the IHOP, leaving aside all the successor issues for the moment that there was a 50 percent interest owned by the IHOP — owned in the IHOP by the decedent when he died.

That happened in the middle of June. From June 15th until yesterday, Ms. Bayou had reversed her position and taken the position that not only was the IHOP owned 100 percent by her, therefore, avoiding any need to account to the Estate in any form but, also, the underlying piece of property. So those two things together, when we have the acknowledgment today in her certification that all four of these companies are, in fact, 50 percent owned or there's a 50 percent interest, which must be accounted for in the name of the decedent, however the Court resolves that question, that must be accounted for, and she has refused to do

1 | that.

As of this date, she continues to refuse the most elementary information about her compensation as the manager of the IHOP restaurant, her distributions as an owner of the ABKA Holdings, which owns the IHOP restaurant, and she has refused our request to set up separate accounts for the LLCs, so that the LLCs are handling their own obligations separately, just for accounting purposes, so that we have rents applied from an LLC to the mortgages that are the LLC's responsibilities.

That might have taken care of the Mid-Grove Properties litigation, which the Bank of America is involved in all by itself. What came in on rent that was owing to Mid-Grove properties had been paid to the mortgage on Mid-Grove properties, but that's clearly not happening. It all gets put into one big hodge pot and commingled and applied in some fashion that she deems best.

We did receive snippets of information that --

THE COURT: Have you made demands? Have you made specific demands for information, in other words, financial records, profit and loss statements, those kinds of things?

MR. BANGIOLA: Oh, yes. But we have not had a filed lawsuit to attach subpoenas to until this point and the rea--

THE COURT: I understand but, I mean, you've written letters and said, look, I need income tax returns for these years. I need profit and loss statements for the last two years. Have you written those kind of letters?

MR. BANGIOLA: Absolutely, sir.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. BANGIOLA: I mean, we have -- you can see -- and before -- and after those letters were written, we had a four-hour meeting -- three-hour meeting at my office with my client present and Ms. Bayou's attorney present where we went through chapter and verse of as much information as we could in the name of achieving a resolution in the recognition that an application for a receiver was a thermonuclear device that was not in anyone's interest and would only -- the Estate would only take that step, if we were forced to.

And at those negotiations, it has always stopped at accounting for the restaurant and that may well be and I suspect that that is because the engine that drives this empire is the cash flow comes from the IHOP restaurant and there's a lot of cash flow.

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In 2009, the last tax return that we have, we see \$2-1/2 million in annual revenue. Now, 2010's revenue is redacted from their opposition. I don't know why that number needs to be redacted. The rest of it can be provided. It doesn't have any particular secrecy. I don't understand why a co-owner has a right to confidentiality from the other owner on information like that, but we do have Ms. Bayou's assertion in her certification that she's getting awards from IHOP for sales growth, that the business is bigger than it ever was before and she's getting national awards. Well, that's great but that information needs to be shared with us and it affects the Estate's interest in that asset. Okay?

Now, I note that they have conceded the irreparable harm caused by losing a business and, unfortunately, they have driven us to the point where we have to seek a receiver or intervention of the Court because they have cut off all distributions. There is no representation that Ms. Bayou was not being paid or is not receiving distributions. Nowhere in this paperwork is that assertion made and that's because it can't be true.

They don't deny that the assets rents from the LLCs are commingled. When you read the

certification that Ms. Bayou submitted, I don't think there can be any question that there's a deadlock in the management of the companies and accounting for the 50 percent that belongs to the Estate is central to resolving the problems.

I don't think four different lawsuits is a normal course of business, three different -- two different foreclosures and two different creditors where the cases are several years old. I don't think those are a normal course. I think, when you read Mr. Ford's certification and the history -- and I was present when the tactic was stated that we're going to seek adjournments and that's what we're doing with our cases.

When the issue of managing the Estate's liabilities came up, I was present for that and I had already seen some of these cases. I think I even appeared in Your Honor's courtroom one time on one of them in August when I got wind of it, and I had seen them and I had seen the rents, some idea what the rents were. I know they're manageable, and they should be managed. But, instead, the Estate's assets, the company's assets are being wasted. So we have a deadlock in that regard.

What is the total revenue? Well, if we have

gross revenue of \$2-1/2 million for 2009 and Ms. Bayou is certifying that it went up, we'll just stay with \$2-1/2 million in revenue and take that until we get what I believe they're obligated to provide. That's \$50,000 a week, plus \$52,000 in rent per month as of April.

Out of that \$52,000 a month, \$15,000 of it was supposed to be paid by ABKA Holdings to New Capital and then New Capital is supposed to -- as an obligor on the business loan to GE Capital, which was used to buy the IHOP, they were supposed to pay out of that money the note. I think that's a reasonable formulation of what went on.

That changed in April. Ms. Bayou -- those statements after that don't show that \$52,000 in revenue because what Ms. Bayou has done since then is to take ABKA's money and apply it. I assume she is paying it to GE Capital because -- I hope she is, but the reason that was done was because it was contemporaneous with the reversal of her position that we owned 50 percent when her lawyer said, no, that was an incorrect letter from the first lawyer that said you own 50 percent of ABKA Holdings. That's not right.

Ms. Bayou owns 100 percent, so, now, Ms. Bayou starts paying it directly from ABKA Holdings because she's asserting 100 percent ownership. I think that's what

1 happened.

It's not good business. It's not clean, it's not careful, it's commingling, and it's not subject to ready accounting. Let's see what else I can do without burdening you with hearing everything I've already put in my brief.

I want to talk about the statutory argument and the pleading that Mr. Fialcowitz has made here. I confess, I'm a little confused. I thought I had comprehensively and liberally pled my client's complaint for a receiver, whether it is a statutory basis or an equity based custodian or receiver as provided by the court rule, which I cited yesterday in my certification I submitted by fax yesterday.

I think Your Honor has authority to appoint a receiver, if the Estate is not getting what it's entitled to. Generally speaking, I think -- I'm trying to read the argument in a way that says something other than we have no remedy whatsoever. I would ask Your Honor to read my pleading liberally with the intention that was behind it to obtain the court of equity's intervention in this case to read our complaint as a request for an equitable or custodian-based receiver. If the statute really does not apply, we should be entitled to some relief and the Estate should not

simply be subject to having the companies thumb their nose at the Estate saying, the man died, you're out of luck.

I don't see that that argument can possibly fly, and I don't see any other way to read these papers. It could be that it is a technical pleading argument and, if that is the case, Judge, I confess to my weakness in poor communication. To read my first count, I think Your Honor must read it in a way that seeks a receiver and sets forth at least an equity base claim because what we are entitled to, we have not been getting.

I'm also baffled by the idea that we have unclean hands. I think this argument is based upon conversations at the meeting of my office, which are obviously settlement discussions where there was discussions about what assets might be things that Ms. Bayou had a claim to and I probably said, well, we'll see. We're going to have to sort that out and didn't yield the point that every asset that was in Africa in the decedent's name necessarily belong to Ms. Bayou. I hardly breached any agreement, and we're talking about a long rambling meeting.

I don't believe that this application should have been forced upon us, but it has been. I think it

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is -- the fact that the Estate has been absolutely cut off as far as distributions, the fact that there are four litigations and we're being deprived of even information on the status of those cases, the fact that we don't have an appraisal or an estimate or any kind of accounting for the actual income of the most important asset that the Estate owns, namely 50 percent of this IHOP restaurant, and the fact that for five months, she confesses that as a tactical matter and really in a fit of peek, it looks like, she thought it was an okay thing to say, I acknowledged your 50 percent interest in June but based on something you said in July, you refused to acknowledge something in a settlement discussions so, now, I've taken the legal position you have no interest in the IHOP. Do your darnedest and just for good measure, we're going to cut off the payments we've been making, so we're going to put a little extra pressure on your to capitulate.

Now, my client has no means of support.

She's the widow of the Estate. She has nominal assets.

She obtained a collision payment for the Mercedes Benz

that was destroyed by her husband in the fatal

accident. She's gotten these interim payments, and

we've been trying to resolve the dispute with the

Estate with the company's or Ms. Bayou's attorneys in a

business-like way.

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Along the way, we've alerted the companies to a conflict on the part of two attorneys, the initial two attorneys, who had previously represented my client, the decedent, in some capacity and whose interests now appear to be adverse to ours and that attorney is still around. That's not the most important thing in the case. The most important thing in the case is that the assets are being applied properly for the debts and for the creditors and for the owners of these companies and in a fair and equitable reason -- a fair and equitable way.

I believe we have established the fact that there is a need for immediate intervention by the Court. Ms. Bayou collected all of the rents on September 1, 2011, and has not accounted for them. We do not have a bank statement. We do not have a description of what that money was used to pay for. We do not know what account it was put into, and we are here on October 27th.

On November 1st, these companies are entitled to receive another \$52,000 in income and my client is still not getting any form of distribution or interim relief to help her keep body and soul together. Under the circumstances, Judge, I ask you to fashion the

appropriate remedy with the least harm necessary to all concerned in accordance with the Court's equitable power, so that at least -- if there's a way that we can avoid breaching the franchise agreement in the Court's equitable power, we would pray that you do that. We are not seeking to destroy. We have -- literally have no option here whatsoever but to proceed this way. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. Mr. Fialcowitz?

MR. FIALCOWITZ: Your Honor, thank you for the opportunity. At the risk of being a broken record, equity follows the law and I could spend an extra 20 minutes taking issue with the facts and factual assertions that Mr. Bangiola just presented to the Court, and I believe that the resolution of today's dispute, as well as the resolution of the entire case, can be found within the provisions of the New Jersey Limited Liability Company Act.

It's undisputed in this record that none of the four limited liability companies at issue had operating agreements. It's established case law. I believe we cited the <u>DENIKE</u> to the Court in our moving brief that, in such a circumstance, the default provisions of the LLC Act control and the LLC Act, in

fact, the Legislature anticipated this exact problem and, when it did so, it not only took into consideration the interests of clients -- my client, it also took into consideration the interest of Mr.

Bangiola's client.

Now, how did it do that? Well, if you start out with Section 24 of the statute, it talks about what happens in the event of death. It talks about end of membership and a limited liability company, and that's at Tab 1. It's the first statute I put in the binder and it talks about, a member shall be disassociated from a limited liability company upon the occurrence of any of the following events. Now, you can tick down and you go to D-4. It says on the second page, four, in the case of a member who is an individual, (a) the member's death.

So then the Legislature enacted the next statute, Section 24.1, to talk about what are the rights of a disassociated member? If someone who dies becomes disassociated, what are the rights of that member? It says, 24.1, upon a member's disassociation, the disassociated member has, subject to Section 39, which is very important and we'll talk about that in a minute, only the rights of an assignee of a member's limited liability interest.

Now, this is critical because, if you go to the comments at Section 1 of the statute where they talk about the purpose of having LLCs, they talk about one of the critical purposes of an LLC is to prevent free transferability of ownership interests. It's not a corporation. It's set up for a different reason, and so they restrict the ability to simply pass on the interest — ownership interest to somebody else that you didn't anticipate being in business with. Our case. My client never anticipated being in business with the Estate of Mr. Bangiola.

But to get myself back on track. So 24.1 talks about the rights of a disassociated member and those rights, if you skip two tabs ahead at Tab 4, Section 44 of the statute talks exactly what those rights are. The assignee of a member's limited liability company interest shall have no right to participate in the management of the business and affairs for the limited liability company, except for two set circumstances.

One, if the other members agree. That is in our case. They've pled in a verified complaint that Adina refused to allow them to participate in the management or if there is a provision in the operating agreement that provides for some sort of successor

rates. There's no operating agreement here, so the general rule controls and the Estate has not right to participate in the management of the business and affairs of a limited liability company.

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It's critical to this case because they now seek in Count 1 of the verified complaint the appointment of a receiver to take over the management of all four limited liability companies, critical. But it goes on and this is another critical provision here in 44. If you look down at Section E of -- Subsection E of Section 44, it says, an assignee shall have no authority to seek or obtain a court order dissolving or liquidating a limited liability company.

Yes. If you go to Count 1 of the verified complaint, that's precisely the remedy they're seeking the Court to do, which is why we cross-moved to dismiss because, as a matter of law, pursuant to Section 44 of the LLC Act, they are prohibited from this relief.

Now, I heard Mr. Bangiola a while ago say that the Court should exercise its equitable powers to leave us some kind of a remedy here. Well, the statute provides for a remedy for their client. The statute doesn't leave them out in the open. If you go back to Section 39 of the statute, it talks about my client's obligation to compensate them for the fair value of

1	their ownership interests in all four LLCs at the time
2	of the disassociation. That means as of the date of
3	death, which is February 5th, 2011. So the statute
4	strikes a balance that basically says, we're entitled
5	to keep management in control but, at the same time,
6	we're responsible for compensating them for the fair
7	value.
8	So what I would say is, is that, there's
9	really no need for equity to intervene. The Act tells
10	everybody what they're supposed to be doing.
11	THE COURT: Well, why isn't your client doing
12	it then?
13	MR. FIALCOWITZ: Because they just retained
14	me two weeks ago.
15	THE COURT: Well, you're here two weeks, but
16	your client has been involved with Mr. Bangiola for
17	four or five months. Why haven't they
18	MR. FIALCOWITZ: I don't know, but I am
19	involved now.
20	THE COURT: Well, isn't that key question? I
21	mean, he's here saying, look, Judge, the remedy I need
22	is I need some I need the managing member to do
23	something other than tell me I'm not going to get my
24	distribution, other than to tell me that I don't have
25	any rights to this property and now you say, well,

Judge, there's a remedy here, but your client doesn't 7 follow it.

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MR. FIALCOWITZ: Right. But what I would say to that is, is that, I think the parties were working toward finding a buyout, which is, again, a lay person's term for the first thing I just discussed in the statute. She certified in her certification that when they met for settlement negotiations back in July, that she had offered Mr. Bangiola, the Estate, a buyout, which was rejected. He may contest that, but that's contested facts.

And the other important detail that's left out of what I just heard factually is that, they -- it was -- and you can look at the correspondence record, too, and it bears this out. In June, one of her prior attorneys writes Mr. Bangiola, lists all the assets she's aware of and makes abundantly clear that her position is, it's 50/50. It's not until the Estate takes the position counter to this agreement, counter the way they've always done business for years, that Mr. Alli is has only title to the Nigerian properties and it's only Mr. Alli that owns Mid-Grove Properties, and it's a fundamental principle of contract law of anticipatory repudiation.

They made it clear to Adina that they were

going to breach, that they were not going to honor her 50 percent ownership interests, and so she was entitled to step back and say, wait a minute, I want some assurance that my ownership interests are going to be protected here, and that is clear New Jersey case law.

And, also, I have to say this, I would be extremely concerned if I were in Adina's position because the Estate has leaked confidential information in the form of tax returns, in the form of bank statements, a copy in the verified complaint. They have attached a bank statement and a tax return that's protected from disclosure in federal law without trying to seal the record, any kind of confidentiality agreement, they've offered it to the so-called creditors who left 20 minutes ago. That's outrageous. It's more than unclean hands. It's a breach of the fundamental partnership agreement, whatever you want to call it, that these individuals had together.

I want to talk about irreparably harm for a second here. The person who is going to suffer irreparable harm, if the Court decides to appoint a receiver is my client. The LLC statute makes clear the benefit of the bargain, if you will, is that my client is going to proceed with the management and operation of the businesses she formed and spent years working

and put all her hard earned money into. Appointment of a receiver will put the IHOP franchise agreement into a material breach.

And, Your Honor, I cannot urge this point enough. We're not just talking about people in this room. We're talking about the 60 part-time and full-time employees who work at the IHOP. We submitted a certification from the mayor or Irvington. This is a big deal, not just for the people in this room, for the people in that community. I'm telling you stuff you already know, but the appointment of a receiver is the most drastic, one of the most drastic things you can do and there's so many other steps that we could take.

I submit that, certainly, in the course of litigation, we're going to -- if an appropriate confidentiality order is in place, we will disclose financial statements, tax returns once there is a written understanding that these materials are to be kept for the use in this litigation only and for purposes of accounting in this litigation only, will not be shared with anybody else.

Again, to address some points that Mr.

Bangiola made. I would disagree with a number of the points that he made in terms of the three other LLCs.

I don't think there's any evidence in the record with

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The standard -- and the Estate didn't set a standard. Even under a custodial receiver, which, again, is the most drastic form of relief that the Court can award and we're barely two weeks into this litigation, is the proofs should be imposing and persuasive. That's according to the LOWENSTEIN
SANDLER/RAVIN SARASOHN case that I cited in my brief.

Judge, the proofs that are submitted aren't even close to persuasive and compelling. They submitted a portion — again, improperly, of ABKA's tax returns that show positive cash flow. They submitted one April, 2011, bank statement from New Capital Investors, which shows positive cash flow after you deduct the \$52,000 minus all the expenses to pay off GE

Capital. There's nothing in this record. Yes.

There's some litigations, but that doesn't warrant the appointment of a receiver, especially since at least two or three of them, they're contested litigations where the LLCs have asserted counterclaims.

And another thing that's been lost in all of the shuffle of attorneys on the other side of the podium in talking to you about this litigation is there's no litigations against ABKA. There's no litigations against Kayway (phonetic) Properties. It's only two LLCs. Adina has submitted in her certification that ABKA New Capital Investors is in full compliance with its loan obligations with GE Capital, major creditor. It's in full compliance with its obligations and is very current on its obligations to its primary food supplier.

Adina, not only has she developed the franchise, she has won awards for IHOP for outstanding performance from a franchise. So the idea that you're going to appoint a receiver who is going to do a better job of managing this franchise doesn't hold water.

It's -- I would urge the Court to apply the law and, in doing so, dismiss Count 1 of the verified complaint because it does not -- again, it puts the IHOP franchise at risk as material breach is defined to

include not only a receiver but an allocation for
dissolution. Thank you.

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THE COURT: Thank you. Reply, Mr. Bangiola, briefly?

MR. BANGIOLA: Yes. I'm looking at the statute 42:2B-24, which I recall the first time I heard this argument that the Estate had no interest because someone died. That was subsequently reversed by the intervening lawyers, Ms. LaGrotta and Ms. Britt, who quickly tried to dissuade me, told me that's not right. My client is getting bad advice and so forth. They disagreed with that calculation.

And one of the things is in -- in the tab -- I guess it's Tab 1 on the second page, down there at the bottom, it talks about the case of a member that is an estate or is acting as a member by virtue of being a personal representative of an Estate. I don't think that means that it's not contemplated -- I don't think it's contemplated in the statute that interests in LLC -- part of a 50 percent owner effervesce even temporarily, so that no one can look after the other 50 percent and that's really what Mrs. Alli's position is. She's responsible to the beneficiaries of the Estate to look after that 50 percent. How does she do it? I mean, how does she assert the right of the Estate to

get compensated for that 50 percent under these circumstances? It's not outside the contemplation of the statute.

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Maybe we've terminated our interest and we're now entitled or required to be disassociated because we've sought a receiver. I do see that in the statute, that that's the poison pill we have to take. If so, we've been forced to take it. If we can find a way not to have done that, we would certainly have tried to avail ourselves of that remedy, and I just would ask Your Honor, please fashion a just remedy and we humbly submit to the Court's judgment on this case. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Counsel.

All right. Are you okay? I realize you kind of stepped in there at the last minute. All right. Thank you. I'm -- this is the return date of the order to show cause in this matter, and I am prepared to rule on the motion and the relief sought in the order to show cause.

Now, the movant seeks the -- the movant with respect to the order to show cause seeks a variety of relief with respect to this matter, including the appointment of receiver, a pendente lite relief with respect to the payment of money to retain and

1	compensate Counsel, the payment of interim relief to
2	Ms. Alli and the damages and imposition of a
3	constructive trust.

The defendant moves to dismiss Count 1 of the complaint, which seeks the appointment of a receiver for all the companies, ABKA, Blue Capital, Mid-Grove, and Kayway, and also seeks in Count 1 the involuntary dissolution of ABKA, Blue Capital, Mid-Grove, and Kayway.

There are -- the background, I should say, is complicated. There are four limited liability corporations. The allegation is that they're jointly owned by the -- all jointly owned by the decedent, Mr. Alli, and Ms. Bayou, and the properties, each has a different interest. New Capital owns the building and land located at 12-- Irvington and New Capital also owns property on Stuyvesant Avenue in Irvington.

Mid-Grove Properties owns 850 Grove Street in Irvington and 506 Central Avenue in Newark, and Kayway Properties owns 856 Grove Street in Irvington, 101 Second Street in South Orange, and 138 Brookside in Irvington. ABKA leases the building at 1212 Springfield and operates the IHOP restaurant franchise at that location.

1	That's there's no dispute here that
2	there's there are there are other pieces of
3	litigation that are pending. There's a BANK OF
4	AMERICAN V. MID-GROVE PROPERTIES, which I have assigned
5	to me. It's a foreclosure case. There's RIGATONI
6	REALTY, LLC V. ALLI, another docket assigned to Judge
7	Levy. That case, by the way, I believe, is also
8	consolidated with two Law Division cases. All revolve
9	around the alleged default on the promissory notes
10	relating to three mortgages and relating to 850 Grove
11	Street, and those properties have been the subject of a
12	lot of discussion and ostensibly have been that case
13	has been resolved, except for the execution of the
14	settlement.
15	BANK OF AMERICA V. MID-GROVE is pending, and
16	that involves the property at 506 Central Avenue in
17-	Newark. There's also two other cases, TRICONIMUS V.

that involves the property at 506 Central Avenue in Newark. There's also two other cases, TRICONIMUS V.

NEW CAPITAL INVESTORS V. -- that's an L docket involving a claim for unpaid construction fees -- alleged unpaid construction fees arising out of the construction of the restaurant and REMIX CONSTRUCTION (phonetic) is another L docket. That involves, again, a claim for construction work. It involves a claim for payment and a counterclaim for damages.

So it's against this procedural background, I

and the dissolution of the LLCs under that statute and, clearly, as a matter of law, Mr. -- the plaintiff is not entitled to that relief.

Now, I -- that's not to say that -- and I dismiss the Count 1 of the complaint without prejudice and -- because that's not to say that the plaintiff doesn't have a remedy. If it's appropriate, as pointed out by Mr. Fialcowitz, there is a concept under our general equity law with respect to a custodial receiver and, certainly, if the facts were demonstrated, then a Court of Chancery under its general equity powers can appoint a receiver to hold and preserve assets and operate a business in a legal manner and that, it seems to me, would apply even to the operation of the LLC and that would be under INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS OF BRIDGE V. MC KEE (phonetic) 114 N.J. Equity 55. It's a 1933 case.

So the -- and it also seems to me that the case law indicates that the Court also has the right and the legal authority to appoint a fiscal agent under the decision in ROACH V. MARGULIES, 42 N.J. Super. 243, Appellate Division 1956. The Appellate Division noted that the Court can and had the authority to appoint the custodial receiver in an effort to avoid injuring the business in its relations with the public and it can --

if there's a substantial evidence, the Court would have the right and the authority to appoint a fiscal agent, if necessary.

I don't think -- and so what I need to say by commenting upon the other remedies that are available here is that, when I look at this record, I think that Mr. Bangiola has sought a remedy under the corporation statute, but it seems to me that by dismissing that claim without prejudice, I'm not indicating that there's no remedy here, if there was an application or if there was a sufficient factual basis for such an application here.

What I have is an application that is really based upon the fact that there's four lawsuits and based upon the fact that Ms. Bayou has had five separate attorneys in a very short period of time and based upon the fact that there — there are allegations that rent is not being properly applied, but I don't think that I have reached the point where there's substantial evidence in the case — in this case, that there's a need for a custodial receiver or a fiscal agent. That's not to say that that could not be — that there could not be an application by Mr. Bangiola based upon additional evidence or based upon additional material that he may obtain or receive.

I believe what has to happen here is there has to be an exchange of information before we take any further action, before the Court takes any further action with respect to Ms. Bayou's continued management of the LLCs, and I do agree with Mr. Fialcowitz that what we're really dealing with here is the right of a disassociated member to receive fair value for his interest in this case, obviously, the Estate's interest in these LLCs, and that's really what seems to me -- maybe that's what the parties were working on but, obviously, they didn't get too far and this resulted -- this breakdown resulted in this litigation.

So what I'm going to do is this. I'm going to order as part of this hearing today that Mr.

Bangiola within five days provide a written demand to Mr. Fialcowitz for the information that he deems necessary in order to evaluate the value of the — the fair value of the interest of his client's interest in the LLC. I'll give Mr. Fialcowitz 30 days in which to respond to that request and I'm basically understanding that this will be a request for income tax returns, profit and loss statements, and other information that's important to understand the value of these businesses and values of these properties.

I will require an order that Mr. Fialcowitz

forward a confidentiality agreement to Mr. Bangiola within five days and Mr. Bangiola can review the same. If you can't resolve it between the two of you, then you can contact me and I'll address the issues with respect to confidentiality. But it does seem to me that we're dealing with tax records, bank records, and those records are proprietary and I would order that the parties agree to a confidentiality agreement. If they can't, of course, then as I say, you come back to me and I'll resolve the issue, whatever that might be with respect to any problems or exceptions that there may be had.

I'm going to order that the parties return to me in approximately 45 days for a case management conference where we're going to deal with the information exchange. We'll deal with any discovery that's necessary. We'll deal with expert witnesses, if necessary. We'll deal with mediation, if that's possible under the circumstances.

Now, I'm denying the application for the interim relief that Mr. Bangiola seeks with respect to the constructive trust and with respect to the payment of funds. \$50,000 was asked for with respect to funding the litigation, but I do believe and I find that Ms. Bayou should immediately continue the payment

of \$3,600 -- that means like tomorrow -- that she had made to -- I guess, it really should be made to the Estate, for -- after Mr. Alli passed away.

10 .

require that and enter that injunction because that's a -- the distribution that had been made, apparently, from the record to Mr. Alli for some period of time and it seems to me that she would continue -- it merely continues the status quo. So, in other words, when I balance the equities here and the hardships to the parties and it seems it favors that kind of injunctive relief because that's the situation that had been in existence while Mr. Alli was alive and had been in existence for some period of time after his death.

When I evaluate the reasonable probability of success on the merits, obviously, Ms. Alli is entitled to some distribution. There are substantial assets here. That's the record, and whether we call it distribution or whether we call it salary or whether we call it return on investment, I guess, those are terms that could be -- that are going to be addressed along the way, but it seems clear to me that Ms. Alli has some interest and to require that there be a continued distribution under these circumstances with these substantial assets is reasonable because it's likely

that there will be some -- that she would be successful on her claim for a distribution.

The -- and, again, it seems to me that there is a legal right to the same as quoted by Mr.

Fialcowitz in the statute. Ms. Alli does have a right to the fair value for the Estate's interest in this -- in these multiple LLCs, and I cannot find that there would be any harm under the circumstances. But, again, as I indicated, this does maintain the status quo and it seems to me that maintaining the status quo is an important consideration under cases such as this where these payments have been made and is the reason why we should not continue.

And cases indicate that where the interlocutor relief seeks to maintain preserve the status quo, then there's a less rigid view of the CROWE factor. See MC KENZIE V. CORZINE, 396 N.J. Super. 405, also, RINALDO V. RLR INVESTMENT at 387 N.J. Super. 387.

The -- it does seem to me, as I said, that this is -- the real cause of action here is the valuing Mr. Alli's interest in these limited liability companies as of the date of his death, less the applicable valuation discounts and it seems to me that, in order to do that and for these parties to move ahead, there has to be a full and a fair exchange of

information regarding the business and financial condition of these companies. That would include, as I say, State and local income tax returns. It also would include information concerning the cash and the profit and loss statements, if available.

All of that, it seems to me that Mr. Bangiola is entitled to -- his client is entitled to and the other one, it does seem to me under the statute that Ms. Bayou is entitled to manage the LLCs as permitted under the statute where there has been a death. It seems to me, because of that death, there is a disassociated member who doesn't have a right as an assignee, as his rights are limited, her rights are limited as an assignee and she cannot manage these LLCs, but she certainly is entitled to information and I guess the other side of that is, she's certainly entitled to take that -- to take the activity of Ms. Bayou into consideration when and if it comes time for the valuation of her interest in this LLC.

So I'll enter that order as indicated, and I would order Ms. Bayou to make the payment tomorrow, the \$3,600 made tomorrow to Ms. Alli. I'm not going to go backwards into September at the moment. I just order that it be started today -- tomorrow, rather. Is there anything else, gentlemen?

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MR. BANGIOLA: Yes, sir. One housekeeping
issue on one of those litigations. On Mid-Grove
Properties in early August, that's the foreclosure
involving Bank of America, that property is rented and
in early August, when we were talking about this, it
was conceded in fact, it was conceded before Your
Honor by Mr. Davis that my client was the titled owner
of Mid-Grove and, despite the equitable issues that
might be wrestled with, that the Estate owned 100
percent of Mid-Grove.

At that point, I said, if that's the case,

I'll take over those -- I'll take over that litigation,

but I need the keys and I need to collect the rent and
then I can handle a piece of litigation. I wrote to

Mr. Davis and sent him a substitution of attorney on
that.

THE COURT: And he filed it.

MR. BANGIOLA: He was supposed to return it with the file and he filed it and it got me in some trouble with Your Honor when you were looking for me a week or ten days ago, and I apologize for that. I didn't know that I was of record in the case. But that was based upon the representation that's now been stepped back, walked back to a 50/50 position. I don't want to be of record in the case without understanding

1	I need to get paid.
2	THE COURT: You can't work that out between
3	the two of you?
4	MR. FIALCOWITZ: I'll work that out. We'll
5	get new Counsel, and we'll take that over.
6	THE COURT: I think that's what you know,
7	again, I hope, if nothing more maybe more than that
8	happened today, but I hope you know, we spent a
9	couple of hours here today and I hope you opened up a
10	line of communication, first, between Counsel,
11	obviously, and, hopefully, later between the litigants.
12	MR. BANGIOLA: Thank you.
13	THE COURT: But I think you're going to be
14	able to work it out. I understand that there will be a
15	substitution coming in, Mr. Fialcowitz,
16	MR. FIALCOWITZ: Yes.
17	THE COURT: with respect to representation
18	in the Mid-Grove matter. I think we're going to need
19	an order. Mr. Bangiola, you'll do the order on this
20	one?
21	MR. BANGIOLA: I will. Yes, sir.
22	THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much.
23	MR. BANGIOLA: Thank you.
24	MR. FIALCOWITZ: Thank you, Your Honor.
25	THE COURT: Good luck to everybody. Thank

1	you.
. 2	(Proceedings Concluded)
3	CERTIFICATION
4	
5	I, SHERRY M. BACHMANN, the assigned transcriber, do
6	hereby certify the foregoing transcript of proceedings
7	on tape number 1, index number from 0001 to 6432, is
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